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Abstract
This paper presents a 3-Region footloose-entrepreneur new economic
geography model. Two symmetric regions are part of an economically
integrated area (the Union), while the third region represents an outside
trade partner. We explore how the spatial allocation of industrial pro-
duction and employment within the Union is a¤ected by changes in two
aspects of trade liberalisation: regional integration and globalisation. Our
main contribution pertains to the analysis of the local and global dynamics
of the specied factor mobility process. We show that signicant parame-
ter ranges exist for which asymmetric distribution of economic activities
is one of the possible long-run outcomes. This is a remarkable result
within the NEG literature. We then analyse the impact of international
trade liberalisation on the dynamics of agglomeration conditional on the
endowments of skilled and unskilled labour of the ouside region.
Keywords: Industrial agglomeration, New Economic Geography, foot-
loose entrepreneurs, local and global dynamics, bifurcation scenarios
JEL classication: C62, F12, F2, R12.
1 Introduction
New Economic Geography (NEG) models do not typically account for the pres-
ence of regions other than the ones involved in the economic integration process.
Nevertheless, a vast body of empirical evidence reveals the ongoing long-term
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parallel trends of increasing regional integration and globalisation. The EU is a
part of this phenomenon: on the one hand, within-EU integration has become
more important over the last decades and, on the other, the EU as a whole has
gained greater exposure to the world economy (Foster et al. [2013]).
The analytic structure of NEG models is intrinsically complex, therefore
many NEG models are actually conned to the analysis of two regions, aiming to
predict the impact of stronger integration on industrial agglomeration in a given
economically integrated area (e.g., EU regions). However, the understanding of
agglomeration and dispersion forces stemming from stronger exposure of the
integrated area to the rest of the world (e.g., EU integration into the world
economy) requires a more general set up including (at least) an outsideregion.
Scholars dealing with 3-region NEG models  see, among others, Paluzie
[2001]; Krugman and Elizondo [1996]; Brülhart et al. [2004] typically explore
how the spatial distribution of economic activities in a given home country is
a¤ected by international trade liberalisation. On the other hand, as pointed out
by Behrens [2011], a large part of this literature underplays the role of regional
integration. That is, one relevant aspect of economic integration globalisation
 is studied, while the second one  regional integration  is left out of the
picture.
Inspired by the case of the EU, the main aim of this paper is to explore how
the spatial allocation of industrial production and employment within an eco-
nomically integrated area (the Union) is a¤ected by changes in both aspects of
trade liberalisation: regional integration and globalisation. Our main objective
is to study the e¤ects of higher integration within the Union (reduced internal
transport costs), and those due to higher economic integration of the Union as a
whole with the rest of the World (reduced external transport costs). This is the
rst contribution of the paper. Furthermore, motivated by the changing picture
of the main trade partners of the EU, we study the impact of both aspects of
integration under alternative assumptions on the industrialisation level of the
Unions trade partners. In particular, we will show that integration with less
industrialised regions will make agglomeration of industrial activity within the
Union less likely. In addition, we also analyse the e¤ects of international inte-
gration under alternative assumptions about the size of the outside region. For
many parameter values, trade liberalisation ultimately leads to agglomeration
of economic activity with the Union. However, the pattern of the transition to
agglomeration depends upon the size of the outside region. When integrating
with a small outsider region, catastrophic agglomeration will be observed; in-
stead when integrating with a large outsider country, the transition path to full
agglomeration will be smooth.
We depart from the existing multi-region NEG models in three ways. In
contrast with most previous contributions, we assume that unskilled workers
are immobile both domestically and internationally. This assumption makes our
model closer to the reality of the EU where labour mobility plays a relatively
unimportant role as compared to other economically integrated areas such as
the US (Gáková and Dijkstra [2008]). On the other hand, we will maintain
that the interregional mobile factor is human / knowledge capital embodied
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in skilled workers and entrepreneurs (Forslid and Ottaviano [2003]). A second
important departure is the specication of our model in discrete time. This
represents an easy way to account for delays in the dynamic process (that are
obviously involved in rm relocations). Finally, we try to ll a relevant gap in
the NEG literature: the lack of explicit dynamic analysis. This is a particularly
relevant issue as many core results of the NEG depend on the properties of
dynamic processes, such as multiple equilibria, change in stability properties, the
nature of the basins of attraction. We carefully analyse the emerging bifurcation
scenarios detecting a typical sequence and show that coexistence of equilibria
is much more pervasive than in standard NEG models. We show that in some
cases  due to the complex structure of the basins of attraction  it is even
impossible to predict the long-run spatial distribution of economic activity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some
stylised facts on the case of EU which inspired our work and reviews the main
ndings of the literature most related to our contribution. Section 3 presents
the general framework of the model including the denition of short-run and
long-run equilibria. Section 4 describes the equilibrium properties of the model.
Section 5 presents results on local and global dynamics of the model. Section 6
concludes.
2 Stylised facts and Related Literature
The departure point for our analysis are three stylised facts:
 Trade barriers among European regions have been lowered by the long
term process of EU integration;
 globalisation has produced greater exposure of the EU to the world econ-
omy, leading to higher dependency of the Union (and of each Member
State) on nal demand outside the EU;
 the deeper integration into the world economy of the EU is currently char-
acterised by an increasing weight of big, less industrialised trade partners.
The strenghtening of the EU internal integration is a well documented fact.
Figure 1 outlines the evolution of economic integration within the EU from 1957
to 2001 based on the composite index developed by Dorrucci et al. [2002]. This
is a numerical composite index based on scores attributed to each single event
of European integration grouped according to Balassa [1961] ve main stages
of regional integration: a) Free Trade Area (FTA) where internal tari¤s and
quotas are abolished for imports from area members; b) Customs Union (CU):
a FTA setting up tari¤s and quotas for trade with non-members; c) Common
Market (CM): a CU where restrictions on factor movements as well as non-
tari¤ barriers to trade are abolished; d) Economic Union (EUN): a CM with
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a signicant degree of co-ordination of national policies and harmonisation of
relevant domestic laws; and (e) Total Economic Integration (TEI), an EUN with
all relevant economic policies conducted at a supra-national level.
Looking at Figure 1 one can identify three sub-periods. The rst period goes
from March 1957 (Treaty of Rome) to July 1968 (completion of the CU) and
is characterised by faster integration as, by the end of this period, more than
half of the overall institutional integration process had been already completed.
In the late 1960s, the EU was indeed much more than a CU, having already
some genuine characteristics of subsequent Balassa stages. The second period
(between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s) is characterised by sluggish inte-
gration, with the noteworthy exception of the European Monetary System start
in March 1979. In the third period, the creation of the CM and the Monetary
Union has led to considerable acceleration in regional integration. As a result,
the EU/euro area in early 2000s could already be classied somewhere between
an EUN and a TEI. The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements to Eastern countries
has then pushed this process forward.
Figure 1: The Index of EU Economic Integration (1957-2001); Source: Dorrucci
et al. [2002]; Notes: The index is dened for the EU-6 founding members;
Highest score possible for regional integration: 100; 1957 = 0.
Turning to the second stylised fact, note that the EU launched in 2006 its
new Global Europe strategy aiming at further integrating the EU into the
world economy (see for a discussion of the institutional progress, Kleimann
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Figure 2: EU-27 value added due to foreign demand by partner (% GDP).
Source: Foster et al. [2013] elaboration on WIOD database
[2013]). One visible consequence of increased globalisation is that production
taking place in an integration area relies more heavily on foreign nal demand.
Such a process has been at the core of European countries recent economic
performances since the exponential expansion of emerging economies such has
China, India and Brazil has provided an increasing demand for otherscountries
products. In a detailed study, Foster et al. [2013] calculate the EU value added
due to foreign nal demand in % of GDP for the 1995-2011 period1 and point out
that since the mid-1990s the dependency of the EU economy on foreign demand
has signicantly increased: in 1995 9.9% of GDP of the EU-27 was produced to
satisfy directly and indirectly foreign demand abroad, while this share has
increased to almost 15% in 2011.2 Interestingly, such an increasing trend has
continued during the years of the great recession.
The trend of increasing dependency of EU income level upon foreign demand
is far from being at rest. According to EC [2013], over the next two years,
90% of world demand will be generated outside the EU. That is why it is a
key priority for the EU to open up more market opportunities for European
1The value added created in an economy due to demand for nal products in other
economies the so-called value added exports (VAX) is described in Johnson and Noguera
[2012]. Foster et al. [2013] calculate the VAX for the set of countries included in the WIOD
database.
2The same holds for employment. EU employment due to foreign demand in % of total
employment has risen from 9.3% in 1995 to 11.6% in 2011.
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business by negotiating new Free Trade Agreements with key countries. If we
were to complete all our current free trade talks tomorrow, we would add 2.2%
to the EUs GDP or e275 billion. This is equivalent of adding a country as
big as Austria or Denmark to the EU economy. In terms of employment, these
agreements could generate 2.2 million new jobs or additional 1% of the EU total
workforce.3
Turning to our third stylised fact, note that the gures for the valued added
due to foreign demand disaggregated by trading partners, reveal striking regional
disparities (see Figure 2): Chinas share increased from 3.3% in 1995 to more
11.1% in 2011 at the expense of Japan (8.1% in 1995 and 3.4% in 2011) and the
US (24.5% in 1995 compared to 18.4% in 2011).
A recent OECD study (Woo [2012]) shows that these changes in the trad-
ing partners involve also a change in the technology level. Based on growth
accounting, (Woo [2012], p15) uncovers a considerable technology gap between
China and the US and Japan respectively. Labour productivity in China as
measured by output per worker is 16% of that of US workers in 2007 and the
total factor productivity level as a measure of technology (or overall e¢ ciency)
in China are 25% of the US counterpart. Japans labour productivity (total
factor productivity) is 69% (54%) of the respective US value.
These facts imply relevant research questions to be answered in multi-region
NEG models. That is, how are both agglomeration and dispersion forces that
drive agglomeration of economic activities a¤ected once deeper integration within
the union and within the world economy is considered? And how relevant are
the size and the industrialisation level of the trade partners?
So far a small strand of literature has developed 3-region models within the
NEG literature. Inspired by the debate on the role of protectionist policies in
the development of a pattern of striking regional inequalities during the Span-
ish industrialisation process, Paluzie [2001] proposes a standard core periphery
model accommodating for the presence of a third region. She considers a world
economy consisting of two domestic regions and one external economy, with
labour being mobile only domestically. In line with Krugman [1991], the cen-
tripetal forces that produce agglomerations are represented by the interaction
of economies of scales, market size and transport costs, while centrifugal forces
that tend to weaken agglomerations are the pull of a dispersed rural market.
The main result in the model is that a reduction in the external trade cost
strengthens the agglomerative forces in the home country with two regions. In
other words, external trade liberalisation is expected to increase regional in-
equalities in the country that opens up to trade. Similar results are put forward
by Alonso-Villar [2001], and Monfort and Nicolini [2000].
Krugman and Elizondo [1996], obtain the opposite result, in the same con-
text of a model with three regions, two domestic and one external, where the
domestic dispersion force is due to land rent and commuting costs and it is thus
exogenous and independent of trade costs. The authors study the impact of
3For an overview of the most important forthcoming and on-going free trade negotiations
see EC [2013].
6
trade liberalisation on the distribution of economic activities within the home
country and conclude that opening up external trade favours dispersion of eco-
nomic activity between the two internal regions. It is claimed in the paper
that such a result explains the rise of large metropolis in developing countries
(Mexico City is the case discussed by the authors) and its progressive loss of
importance after the implementation of trade liberalisation policies.
Brülhart et al. [2004] and Crozet and Soubeyran [2004] introduce more ge-
ographical structure into the analysis, as they assume that one of the home
regions is a border region, i.e. that it has lower transport cost with respect to
the outside region than the other home region. Also in these frameworks, a re-
duction of the international transport cost favours agglomeration in the 2-region
home country.
Brülhart et al. [2004] present a footloose entrepreneur model  a 3-region
version of Püger [2004] where two of the three regions are relatively inte-
grated. The aim of the authors is to track how the economies of these two
regions are a¤ected by an opening towards the third region. The real world
case that motivate this work is the 2004 EU enlargement, which integrated ten
Central and Eastern European countries (the third region) fully into the EUs
internal market. The research question is then linked to the implications for
the distribution of economic activities in the incumbent EU countries of the im-
proved access to and from the third region. In the model, the production of the
manufactured good requires one unit of human capital and a variable amount
of labour. Human capital is mobile between the two regions in one country but
immobile with respect to the third region. The sectorial location is determined
endogenously through the interplay of agglomeration and dispersion forces. Ex-
ternal market opening has a bearing on several spatial forces. Forces related
to better access to foreign export markets and cheaper imports enhance the
locational attraction of the border region. Conversely, forces related to import
competition from foreign rms enhance the locational attraction of the interior
region. The interplay of these forces in the non-linear setup of the model can
lead to a variety of equilibria. The main results are such that the range of
parameter values, for which domestic manufacturing agglomerates in only one
region, increases as external trade costs fall. The same result obtains if given
constant external trade costs the foreign country gets bigger, i.e., the larger
the outside economy, ceteris paribus, the greater the probability that domestic
manufacturing agglomerates in one region. Hence, the size of the third region
matters for the results.
Wang and Zheng [2013] notice that in most developing economies, like China,
a country includes a gate region and the hinterland, where the gate region has
better access to overseas markets and the hinterland has a greater share of
unskilled workers. Hence, they extend the standard framework of Krugman
[1991] by assuming that domestic regions are asymmetrical in terms of their sizes
and accessibilities. They obtain two key results. First, when international trade
liberalisation continues but domestic regions remain poorly integrated, the gate
region experiences a change from partial to full agglomeration. Second, when a
country is closed to global markets, regional integration makes the hinterland
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attractive to a greater share of manufacturing rms. However, when a country
is extremely open to global markets, full agglomeration of manufacturing rms
occurs in the gate region.
With the exception of Brülhart et al. [2004] and Crozet and Soubeyran
[2004], in the above mentioned contributions, labour mobility is the dynamic
process bringing agglomeration about. This is the case of Krugman and Elizondo
[1996] for Mexico, Paluzie [2001] for Spain andWang and Zheng [2013] for China.
In all these cases labour mobility is plausible whereas this is not the case for
the EU.
As shown by Gáková and Dijkstra [2008], labour mobility between the re-
gions of the EU at NUTS 2 level is relatively low. This seems to be a common
feature in the EU as it applies to both the old and the new Member States, irre-
spective of their economic development or the openness of their labour market.
In particular, the analysis provided by Gáková and Dijkstra [2008] shows that
the share of working age residents moving in another EU region represents, on
average, less than 1% of the EUs working age population (vs 2% in the US).4 As
migration in Europe is rather weak, as far as the EU is concerned, the mobility
of unskilled workers does not really appear to play the role of an adjustment
process to wage di¤erential among countries (Siebert [1997]; Obstfeld and Peri
[1998]; Puga [2002]). On the other hand, rm mobility has been achieving an
increasing role since the EU enlargement to the Eastern European countries
from the mid-1990s.
The contributions whose main results have been summarised earlier in this
section share the common feature of addressing only one part of the issues
at hand as they only analyse the e¤ects of a closer integration of the home
economy with the rest of the world, independently of the transportation costs
within the home economy itself. Nevertheless, conning our attention to the
EU, two parallel trends have been taking place in the last decades  gaining
momentum with the EU enlargement to the Eastern European countries and
provide the rst two stylised facts for our theoretical framework. Moreover,
the higher importance gained by China at the expenses of the US provides a
motivation for studying the e¤ects of globalisation conditional upon the size and
the output composition of the external commercial partners.
3 General framework
In this section we present a variant of the 3-region NEG model developed in
Forslid and Ottaviano [2003] where the mobile factor is human / knowledge
capital, embodied in skilled workers or, equivalently in their framework, entre-
preneurs. This is particularly convenient in a multiregional framework for two
reasons. First, the assumption of mobile skilled workers / entrepreneurs implies
4The analysis presented in this paper is based on the average share of the working age
residents in 2005-2006 who had changed their region of residence during the previous year.
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analytical tractability and it matches the empirical evidence (esp. for Europe)
according to which skilled workers / entrepreneurial undertakings are typically
more mobile than less specialised labour (Forslid and Ottaviano [2003], p. 230).
Di¤erently from Forslid and Ottaviano [2003], we envisage a situation in which
the entrepreneurs mobility could be limited by various types of barriers (for ex-
ample: national, cultural, language and legal barriers), even stronger than those
constraining the unskilled workforce migration. Specically, in our framework,
entrepreneurial migration occurs only within an economically integrated area (a
Union composed of two regions) and no factor movements take place between
the Union and the rest of the World.
3.1 Basic assumptions
We consider an economy composed of 3 regions (r = 1; 2; 3). Regions 1 and
2 are part of an economically integrated area (the Union); region 3 instead
represents an outside trade partner. There are two sectors, agriculture (A) and
manufacturing (M). There is a unique homogeneous agricultural good produced
under perfect competition, while manufacturing involves n di¤erentiated vari-
eties produced by monopolistically competitive rms. Unskilled workers (L)
and entrepreneurs (E) are endowed with (unskilled) labour and human capi-
tal, respectively. Workers are immobile (but can be reallocated across sectors),
whereas entrepreneurs can migrate only between region 1 and 2, i.e. within the
Union. We assume that there is not factor mobility between the Union and
region 3.
L is the amount of unskilled labour in the overall economy and r is the share
of labour located in region r(= 1; 2; 3); it follows that rL is the endowment of
unskilled workers of region r. With immobile unskilled workers and a constant
and equal to one wage rate (see below), rL can also be interpreted as the size of
local demand (r representing its share) which is not a¤ected by entrepreneurial
migration. When regions 1 and 2 are symmetric, we have that 1 = 2 =  and
3 = 1   2. Moreover, E represents the overall number of entrepreneurs in
the economy and eE the number of entrepreneurs that are free to move between
regions 1 and 2. We denote by en = eEE the corresponding share. Consequently,
E = E   eE represents the number of immobile entrepreneurs located in region
3 and 1  en = EE = 1  eEE is the corresponding share.
3.2 Consumerspreferences
The three regions are homogeneous in terms of tastes. Individual (entrepreneur
or unskilled worker) preferences are expressed by a two-tier utility function. The
upper-tier concerns the choice between agricultural and manufactured goods
according to the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U = CMC
1 
A
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where CA is the consumption of the agricultural good. The lower-tier concerns
the consumption of the composite of manufactured varieties, CM , given the
following CES function:
CM =
 
nX
i=1
c
 1

i
! 
 1
where ci represents the quantity consumed of the variety i, with i = 1; :::; n; 
the constant elasticity of substitution / taste for variety: the closer  to 1, the
greater is consumers taste for variety, with  > 1; and  and 1  represent the
income shares devoted to the manufactured varieties and to the homogeneous
agricultural good, respectively, with 0 <  < 1.
The budget constraint of an individual resident in region r is
NX
i=1
epici + pACA = y (1)
where pA is the price of the homogeneous agricultural good; epi is the price
of variety i inclusive of transport costs and y is the income of the individual
agent (unskilled worker or entrepreneur).
3.3 Production
The A sector is characterised by perfect competition and constant returns to
scale. Production of 1 unit of output requires only  unit of L; without loss
of generality, we set  = 1. Moreover, we assume that none of the regions has
enough labour to engage exclusively in the production of the agricultural good,
that is, the so-called non-full-specialisation conditionholds.
TheM sector is (Dixit-Stiglitz) monopolistically competitive. It is modelled
according to a few basic characteristics: identical rms produce di¤erentiated
goods / varieties with the same production technology involving a xed compo-
nent (one entrepreneur), and a variable component (unskilled workers), with 
units of L required for each unit of the di¤erentiated good.
The total cost of producing the quantity qi of a variety i corresponds to:
CT (qi) = i + wqi
where i represents the xed cost component and the remuneration of the
entrepreneur, with i = 1; :::; n.
Given consumers preference for variety and increasing returns, each rm
will always produce a variety di¤erent from those produced by the other rms.
Moreover, since one entrepreneur is required for each manufacturing rm, the
total number of rms / varieties, n, always equates the total number of entre-
preneurs, E = n. Denoting by xt the share of entrepreneurs located in region 1
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during the time unit t, and recalling the notation introduced above, the number
of regional varieties produced in region r(= 1; 2; 3) during that period can be
expressed as
n1;t = xt eE = xtenE
n2;t = (1  xt) eE = (1  xt)enE
n3;t = E = (1  en)E
where 0  xt  1.It also follows that nr;t, en and 1  en correspond to the size
of the manufacturing sector in region r, in the Union and in the outside region,
respectively.
3.3.1 Trade costs
Distance plays a crucial role in NEG models. Trade between regions can be
inhibited by various types of costs that can involve transportation and / or
(tari¤s or non tari¤) barriers and / or other types of impediments / frictions. We
adopt a broad denition of trade costs. Following Anderson and van Wincoop
[2004], pp. 691-692): [t]rade costs broadly dened, include all costs incurred in
getting a good to a nal user other than the marginal cost of producing the good
itself: transportation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy barriers
(tari¤s and nontari¤ barriers), information costs, contract enforcement costs,
costs associated with the use of di¤erent currencies, legal and regulatory costs,
and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail). Typically, NEG models
assume that transportation of the agricultural good is costless. On the other
hand, trade costs for manufacturers take an iceberg form: if one unit is shipped
from region s to region r, only 1Trs arrives at destination, where Trs  1 and
r; s = 1; 2; 3.
Region 1 and 2 (the Union) are involved in a trade agreement whereas the
economic integration with region 3 (the outside region) is less deep. We model
this spatial arrangement as follows: the three regions are located on the vertices
of a isosceles triangle. The internal distance(trade barriers) between regions
1 and 2 is S (short); the "external distance" between 1 and 3 and 2 and 3 is the
same and it is equal to L (long). Moreover, trade costs do not depend on the
direction of thet trade ow (Trs = Tsr). Trade costs between region 1 and 2 are
T12 = TS
and between regions 1 and 3 and regions 2 and 3 are
T13 = T23 = TL
where TL > TS  1. Finally, in order to simplify the notation, we introduce
the standard transformation of trade costs into the following trade freeness
parameters: 12 = S and 13 = 23 = L, where S  T 1 S and L  T 1 L
and where L < S  1.
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3.4 Short-run general equilibrium
The short-run general equilibrium (SRGE) in period t is dened by a given
spatial allocation of entrepreneurs across regions, xten and (1  xt)en in regions 1
and 2 and the invariant share 1 en in region 3. In a SRGE, which is established
istantaneously in each period, supply equals demand for the agricultural com-
modity and each manufacturer meets the demand for its variety. Moreover, as a
result of Walrass law, simultaneous equilibrium in the product markets implies
equilibrium in the regional labour markets.
With zero transport costs, the agricultural price pA is the same across re-
gions. Since competition results in zero agricultural prots, the short-run equi-
librium nominal wage w is equal to the agricultural product price and it is
also equalised across regions. Setting this wage / agricultural price equal to
1, it becomes the numeraire in terms of which the other prices are dened,
w = pA = 1.5
Facing a wage of 1, each manufacturer has a marginal cost of . Each
maximizes prot on the basis of a perceived price elasticity of   and sets a
local (mill) price p for its variety, given by
p =

   1 (2)
The demand facing a producer located in region r (where it is also taken
into account the part that is melting along the waybecause of iceberg trade
costs) corresponds to:
dr;t =
 
3X
s=1
Ys;tP
 1
s;t T
1 
rs
!
p  =
 
3X
s=1
ss;tP
 1
s;t rs
!
p Y
=
 
3X
s=1
ss;t
s;t
rs
!
p 1
Y
E
(3)
where
Pr;t =
 
RX
s=1
n1 s;t p
1 T 1 rs
! 1
1 
= 
1
1 
r;t E
1
1  p; (4)
is the price index facing consumers in region r; Ys;t represents income and
expenditure in region s; ss;t =
Ys;t
Y denotes region ss share in expenditure and
s = 1; :::; 3. Moreover, we have dened
r;t = xtenr1 + (1  xt)enr2 + (1  en)r3
5Denoting by Y the income of the overall economy, that (as conrmed below) is invariant
over time, total expenditure on the agricultural product is (1   )Y . Assuming (1   )Y >
max (2L; (1  )L) all regions produce the agricultural commodity, whereas (1   )Y >
max (L; (1  2)L) implies that no single region is able to satisfy all the demand for the
agricultural good.
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SRGE in region r requires that each rm meets the demand for its variety.
For a variety produced in region r,
qr;t = dr;t (5)
where qr;t is the output of each rm located in region r. From equation
(2), the short-run equilibrium operating prot / entrepreneur remuneration per
variety in region r is
r;t = pqr;t   qr;t = pqr;t

: (6)
Since prot equals the value of sales time 1= and since total expenditure on
manufacturers is Y , the total prot received by entrepreneurs is Y=. Total
income is Y = L+ Y=, so that
Y =
L
   : (7)
Total prot is therefore L=(   ).6
Using (2) to (7), the short-run equilibrium prot in region r is determined
by the spatial distribution and by the regional expenditure shares
r;t =
 
3X
s=1
Ys;tP
 1
s;t T
1 
rs
!
p1 

=
 
RX
s=1
ss;t
s;t
rs
!
Y
E
(8)
Under our assumptions on trade costs across regions, we can write
1;t =

s1;t
1;t
+
s2;t
2;t
S +
s3;t
3;t
L

Y
N
2;t =

s1;t
1;t
S +
s2;t
2;t
+
s3;t
3;t
L

Y
N
3;t =

s1;t
1;t
S +
s2;t
2;t
S +
s3;t
3;t

Y
N
(9)
where
1;t = x1en+ (1  xt)enS + (1  en)L,
2;t = xtenS + (1  xt)en+ (1  en)L,
3;t = xtenL + (1  xt)enL + 1  en = 1  en(1  L):
Regional incomes / expenditures are:
6Equation (7) conrms that total income is invariant over time. From (7), (1   )Y >
max (2L; (1  )L) is equivalent to min(2 + (1   2)   ; 2 [(1  )+    ]) > 0;
and (1  )Y > max (L; (1  2)L) is equivalent to min(2 [+ (1  )   ] ; (1  2)+
2   ) > 0. The former is a su¢ cient non-full-specialisation condition and the latter is a
necessary one, where both are expressed in terms of the utility parameters.
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Yr;t = Lr;t + nr;tr;t
Under our assumptions on trade costs and unskilled labour endowments, we
can write:
Y1;t = L+ xtenE
Y2;t = L+ (1  xt)enE
Y3;t = (1  2)L+ (1  en)E (10)
Using (9) and (10) the regional income shares can be expressed in terms of
xt:
s1;t =
(   ) + enxt " L3;t  

L
3;t
  S2;t

( )+en(1 xt)L3;t

 en(1 xt) 12;t  L3;t 
#
h
   enxt  11;t   L3;ti
"
1 

L
3;t
  S2;t

L
3;t
  S1;t

2en2xt(1 xt)h
 en(1 xt) 12;t  L3;t ih enxt 11;t  L3;t i
#
s2;t =
(   ) + en(1  xt)" L3;t  

L
3;t
  S1;t

( )+enxtL3;t

 enxt 11;t  L3;t 
#
h
   en(1  xt) 12;t   L3;ti
"
1 

L
3;t
  S2;t

L
3;t
  S1;t

2en2xt(1 xt)h
 en(1 xt) 12;t  L3;t ih enxt 11;t  L3;t i
#
s3;t = 1  s1;t   s2;t
Given that the agricultural price is 1, the real income / indirect utility of an
entrepreneur in region r is:
Vr;t =
r;t
Pr;t
Notice that the real income of an entrepreneur located in region 3 is a¤ected
by the distribution of the manufacturing activity between region 1 and 2, even
though no migration takes place from that region towards the other two.
Letting en = 1 an interesting result can be shown:
Proposition 1 In the absence of a manufacturing sector in region 3, en = 1,
real incomes in region 1 and 2 are not a¤ected by the distance from region 3.
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This can be easily checked in (4), in (9) and in the expressions for the income
shares considering that, when en = 1, 1;t = x1+(1 xt)S , 2;t = xtS+1 xt
and 3;t = L:
According to Proposition 1, external trade liberalisation has no impact on
the locational choices of entrepreneurs within the Union in the absence of a
manufacturing sector in the outside region. This result follows from three fea-
tures of the model set up: (i) the demand for the manufactured goods is unitary
elastic: the change in trade costs, via L;determines a proportional change in
the price index in region 3 and a similar but inversely proportional change in
the quantity demanded, so the overall change of expenditures on manufacturing
in this region is zero; (ii) since region 3 does not produce manufactured vari-
eties, a change in L does not impact on price indices in regions 1 and 2; (iii)
the distance between regions 1 and 3 and that between 2 and 3 are the same,
so that prices of imported manufactured goods in region 3 do not depend on
entrepreneurslocational choice between region 1 and region 2.
3.5 The entrepreneurial migration hypothesis and the com-
plete dynamical model
Since the share of entrepreneurs located in region 3 is given, migration only
involves regions 1 and 2. The central dynamic equation is analogous to the
replicator dynamics, widely used in evolutionary game theory:
Zt+1 = xt

1 + 

V1;t   [xtV1;t + (1  xt)V2;t]
xtV1;t + (1  xt)V2;t

(11)
where  represents the migration speed. According to (11), the share of en-
trepreneurs in region 1, Zt+1, depends on a comparison between the real income
/ indirect utility gained in that region and the weighted average of the incomes
/ indirect utilities in region 1 and 2. Expression (11) can be reformulated in
terms of the relevant state variable xt:
Zt+1 = Z(xt) = 

1 + (1  xt) T (xt)
1 + xtT (xt)

where T (xt) =
V1;t
V2;t
  1 =
s1;t
1;t
+
s2;t
2;t
S+
1 s1;t s2;t
3
L
s1;t
1;t
S+
s2;t
2;t
+
1 s1;t s2;t
3
L

2;t
1;t
 
1    1
Taking into account the constraints, 0  xt  1, the full dynamical model
corresponds to the map:
xt+1 = (xt) =
8<: 0 if Z(xt) < 0Z(xt) if 0  Z(xt)  1
1 if Z(xt) > 1
(12)
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In what follows, for convenience, we drop the subscript t.
A long-run stationary equilibrium involves (x) = x, where x represents
a xed point of the map (12). There are three types of xed points, concerning
the location of the manufacturing secor within the Union (given the share of
entrepreneurs located in region 3):
1. the Core-Periphery equilibria are characterised by full agglomeration in
region 1 or in region 2. These are: xCP (0), corresponding to complete ag-
glomeration in region 2, which gives Z(0) = 0; and xCP (1), corresponding
to complete agglomeration in region 1, which gives Z(1) = 1.
2. the symmetric equilibrium is characterised by an equal split of the manu-
facturing sector between region 1 and 2: x = 12 , that gives Z
 
1
2

= 12 . It
also implies T
 
1
2

= 0.
3. the asymmetric interior equilibria are characterised by incomplete agglom-
eration in one of the two regions of the Union, with some industry still
present in the other region. The following cases are possible depending on
parameters conguration:
Case 1: no asymmetric xed point exists;
Case 2: two asymmetric xed points exist which are symmetric around 12 :
xa, 1  xa;
Case 3: four asymmetric xed points exist two by two around 12 : xa, 1  xa
and xb, 1  xb.
These equilibria are obtained by solving the conditions Z(xi) = xi and
Z(1  xi) = 1  xi, which imply T (xi) = 0 and Z(1  xi) = 0, where i = a; b.
4 Properties of the equilibrium
In the following we take a closer look at the properties of the xed point, in par-
ticular at the sectoral employment structure measured by the share of unskilled
workers that are employed in the manufacturing sector (skilled workers are en-
tirely employed in manufacturing). Note that our model allows for di¤erences
between the regions in relative skill endowment (i.e. the ratio between skilled
and unskilled workers residing in the region under consideration) and for di¤er-
ences in skill requirements between the two industries (skilled workers are used
only in the manufacturing sector). This allows to analyse the determinants of
the sectoral employment structure from an Heckscher-Ohlin perspective in the
sense of establishing the link between sectoral employment structure and rela-
tive skill endowment comparing all three regions. Has the region with a higher
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skill endowment also the bigger manufacturing sector (measured by the share
of unskilled employment)?
We start with the symmetric equilibrium. Recall that the endowment of
unskilled workers in region 1 is equal to L (which is also the endowment of
region 2); the endowment of region 3 equals (1  2)L. Note that in a symmetric
equilibrium 1 = 2 = 0:5~n + L + 0:5~nS   ~nL and 3 = 1   ~n (1  L)
holds; as well as s1 = s2 and s3 = 1   2s1. Therefore, the ratio of unskilled
employment in manufacturing and total endowment (employment) of unskilled
labour in region r, USRr, is equal to
USR1 = USR2 =

s1(1+S)
0:5~n+L+0:5~nS ~nL +
(1 2s1)L
1 ~n(1 L)

 1

Y
E 
~n
2E
L
USR3 =

2s1L
0:5~n+L+0:5~nS ~nL +
1 2s1
1 ~n(1 L)

 1

Y
E  (1  ~n)E
(1  2)L
The relative employment ratio is
USR1
USR3
=
Num1
Num3
0:5~nE
L
(1 ~n)E
(1 2)L
with
Num1 = 2

S   2 (L)2 + 1

(1  ~n) (   ) +L (~n+ 2L   ~nL)+L~n (S   L)
and
Num3 =

S   2 (L)2 + 1

~n (   ) (1  2) + 2L + 2~nL (L   1)
Note that
0:5~nE
L
(1 ~n)E
(1 2)L
is the relative endowment ratio (skilled labour to unskilled
labour in region 1 and region 3 resp.).
Therefore, relative employment ratio 6 relative endowment ratio ifNum1 6
Num3 or if Num1  Num3 6 0.
It can be shown that the relative employment ratio is equal to the relative
endowment ratio, i.e. that
Num1 Num3 =

S   2 (L)2 + 1

(   ) (2   ~n)+L (1  L) (3~n  2)+~nL (S   L) = 0
if the following 3 conditions hold:
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1. if ~n = 23 ; i.e. if the skilled workers/units of human capital/entrepreneurs/rms
are equally distributed over all 3 regions.
2. if  = ~n2 (implying that 1   2 = 1   ~n holds as well); i.e. if each rm/
skilled workers/units of human capital/entrepreneurs located in any region
has the same number of unskilled workers residing in this region; taking
the number of unskilled workers in each region as a measure of the size of
the home market this condition holds, if no location o¤ers advantages wrt
local market size.
3. if L = S ; i.e. if no location o¤ers an advantage wrt transport costs.
If any of these 3 conditions is not satised, then the relative employment
ratio is not equal to the relative endowment ratio. Note that condition 2 and
condition 3 have a direct NEG interpretation.
It can be shown that USR1USR3 decreases with , and that it increases with
~n - both results are in line with an Heckscher Ohlin intuition: increasing ,
i.e. the relative endowment of unskilled workers, reduces the relative share
of employment in the manufacturing sector (the two regions integration area
specialize in agriculture); increasing ~n, i.e. increasing the endowment with
skilled labour, leads to a relative specialization in the manufacturing sector.
Wrt the transport cost, it can be shown that USR1USR3 increases with S : a
reduction of the internal trade costs fosters industry in the 2-regions integra-
tion area and this area specializes in manufacturing (and the third region in
agriculture).
Wrt L, only local results at  =
~n
2 and ~n =
2
3 can be obtained:
USR1
USR3
has a parabolic shape in L with
USR1
USR3
= 1 for L = S and L = 0,
and with USR1USR3 > 1 for 0 < L < S .
Starting with prohibitive trade costs wrt the third country, a slight reduc-
tion in the trade barriers (a slight increase in the trade freeness) fosters industry
in the 2-region country (that specialises in industry); if we start from identi-
cal trade costs between all three regions, reducing the trade freeness wrt the
third country again fosters manufacturing in the two regions country (which
specialises in manufacturing).
Let us now turn to the Core-Periphery equilibrium in which the mobile
rms are agglomerated in region 1. This case turns out to be analytically more
complex and only local results can be obtained. With L = S , ~n = 0:5
and  = 13 region 1 and region 3 are identical; and the relative employment
ratio equals the endowment ratio. For that point, we have (local) results for
the derivatives: Wrt endowment variation, the Heckscher Ohlin intuition still
applies - the relative employment ratio decreases with , and it increases with
~n. Wrt the transport cost, it can be shown that the relative employment ratio
increases with S and it decreases with L. The last result is a bit more general,
it holds for all 0  L  S .
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The analysis in this section is centered on how the employment structure
inside the 2-region Union is a¤ected by changes in trade costs and in relative
endowments with entrepreneurs or labour, always in comparison to the mirror
developments in the outside region. It turned out that the Heckscher-Ohlin
intuition carries over to an astonishingly large extent. However, at the heart
of a New Economic Geography perspective are not so much comparative static
properties as the dynamic processes: Under what conditions the symmetric
equilibrium inside the Union is destabilized and a self-reinforcing agglomeration
process sets in leading to a Core-periphery pattern? The next section explicitly
addresses the properties of the dynamic process. Note that the dynamic process
is based on the mobility of rms; it thus involves only the two regions inside the
Union on which the subsequent analysis focuses.
5 Local and global dynamics
In the present section we discuss some analytical and numerical results related
to local and global dynamics of the map  dened in (12). Indeed, in spite
of the fact that this map is one-dimensional, its complicated form allows to
obtain only a few analytical results, therefore numerical investigation is quite
important. It helps, in particular, to get an idea about the overall bifurcation
structure of the parameter space of the map and about bifurcation sequences
which can be observed under variation of its parameters.
5.1 Preliminaries
We begin the dynamic analysis by exploring the local stability of the xed points
of the map  listed in the previous section. Recall that the map  always has
two Core-Periphery xed points, xCP (0) = 0 and xCP (1) = 1; as well as one
symmetric xed point x = 12 : An important property of the map  is related
to its symmetry with respect to x: it can be checked that (1  x) = 1 (x):
Thus, any invariant set A of the map  (such as xed points, cycles, chaotic
attractors, basins of attraction, etc.) is either symmetric itself with respect
to x, or there exists one more invariant set A0 which is symmetric to A. In
particular, if the map  has an asymmetric xed point x = xa; then the xed
point symmetric to it x = 1 xa  x0a also exists. As already mentioned,  can
have one or two couples of asymmetric xed points. In Fig.3 we show examples
of the map  and its xed points xCP (0); xCP (1); and x for di¤erent parameter
values.
Let us rst summarize stability properties of the CP xed point xCP (1). The
same conclusions hold for xCP (0) due to the symmetry of the map : Recall that
xCP (1) is a border point at which the map  is not di¤erentiable, thus, one can
only discuss a one-side stability of xCP (1): In fact, this xed point is always
one-side superstable with the related one-side eigenvalue 0+(1) = 0. Due to the
upper constraint of the map  we have obviously 0 (1)  0 (in fact, if Z 0(1) < 0
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Figure 3: The map T for  = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10;  = 0:25; L = 0:1; n = 0:8
and S = 0:11; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5 and 0:7 (the direction indicated by an arrow
corresponds to increasing S).
then 0 (1) = 0), and if 
0
 (1) < 1 (or > 1) then x
CP (1) is one-side attracting
(one-side repelling, respectively). To shorten, using the notion of stability with
respect to the CP xed points from now on we mean one-side stability. Thus,
stability loss of xCP (1) can occur if its eigenvalue passes through 1, that is,
0 (1) = 1: We have
0 (1) = Z
0(1) = 1   T (1)
1 + T (1)
;
so that stability condition of xCP (1) is
0  1   T (1)
1 + T (1)
< 1; (13)
from where we get the following inequalities:
0 < T (1)  1
   1 :
Here the condition
T (1) =
1
   1 (14)
corresponds to 0 (1) = 0; so that x
CP (1) is both sides superstable, and for
T (1) >
1
   1
the at branch (x) = 1 entersthe interval I = [0; 1] ; while the condition
T (1) = 0 (15)
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is related to 0 (1) = 1; that is, to the stability loss of x
CP (1): Given that this
xed point always exists, this bifurcation cannot be related to a (one-side) fold
bifurcation. As we shall see the xed point xCP (1) losses stability due to a
one-sidetranscritical bifurcation which we call border-transcritical bifurcation
(see, for example, Fig.4 where the border-transcritical bifurcation is indicated
by green circles). It is associated with an asymmetric xed point with which
xCP (1) merges at the bifurcation value and changes stability. The asymmetric
xed point can be born either due to a fold bifurcation, in which case it appears
in a couple with one more asymmetric xed point (as, for example, in Fig.4c
where the fold bifurcation is indicated by black circles), or due to pitchfork
bifurcation of the symmetric xed point x (indicated in Fig.4 by red circles).
In fact, the stability condition of x dened by  1 < 0   12 < 1 is satised for
 1 < 1 + 
4
T 0

1
2

< 1 (16)
(to get this condition weve used the equality T
 
1
2

= 0 which is easy to check),
or
  8

< T 0

1
2

< 0: (17)
If
T 0

1
2

=   8

(18)
then 0
 
1
2

=  1; so that x undergoes a ip bifurcation, while the equality
T 0

1
2

= 0 (19)
is related to 0
 
1
2

= 1; so that x undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation (due to the
symmetry of the map fold or transcritical bifurcations cannot occur). In case of
supercritical pitchfork bifurcation of x the asymmetric xed points x = xa and
x = 1   xa  x0a born due to this bifurcation are attracting (see, e.g., Fig.4a).
Then the attracting xed point x0a collides with repelling xed point x
CP (1)
due to the border-transcritical bifurcation. In contrast, in the subcritical case
two repelling xed points x = xb and x = 1   xb  x0b are born, and then the
repelling xed point x0b collides with the attracting xed point x
CP (1) due to
the border-transcritical bifurcation (see, e.g., Fig.4b).
In Sec.5.3 we present numerical results related to the mentioned above local
bifurcations, as well as results on global dynamics of the map  for the general
case 0 < en  1, while in the next subsection we assume en = 1 in which case it is
possible to get more analytical results on local stability of the xed points (see
also Commendatore et al. [2012]).
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Figure 4: 1D bifurcation diagrams for L = 0:1; n = 0:8;  = 6;  = 0:45;  =
10 and  = 0:05; S 2 [0:3; 0:38] in a),  = 0:35; S 2 [0:68; 0:7] in b),  = 0:18;
S 2 [0:6074; 0:6078] in c).
5.2 Stability of the xed points: the case en = 1
For en = 1 the condition (13) related to the stability of the CP xed point xCP (1)
can be written as
   1

' <  < ' (20)
where
' =

(   )[ + S(1  2)] + [(1  ) + ]2S
and  = 
 +1
 1
S
For 1 <  < 1 +  and 0  S < 1, the right hand side inequality in (20)
is always satised; for  > 1 +  it can be shown that the right hand side
inequality in (20) is satised for su¢ ciently high values of S and violated for
low values (hint: we are dealing with two monotonically decreasing function of
S , the rst, (S), tends to innity for S ! 0 and it is equal to 1 at S = 1;
the second, '(S), is positive (and larger than 1) but nite at S = 0 and it is
equal to 1 at S = 1. Since at S = 1 the rst derivative of the rst function
is smaller in absolute value than the derivative of the second function, the two
necessarily cross at some S = 
tr
S , where 0 < 
tr
S < 1). It is not possible
to specify the corresponding bifurcation value for the (internal) trade freeness
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parameter S explicitly, however, it is possible to nd an explicit expression for
, see (28).
For  > 1 + , as S crosses 
tr
S from left to right, the map  undergoes
a border-transcritical bifurcation: the CP xed point xCP (1) merges with the
asymmetric xed point gaining stability. Symmetrically, xCP (0) meets the other
asymmetric xed point gaining stability. From this we infer that the asymmetric
xed points must have always the same local stability properties in the neigh-
borhood of the CP xed points (as can be seen, for example, in Fig.7).
The left hand side inequality in (20) holds for a su¢ ciently small value of :
 <
1
1  ' 1 :
When this latter condition does not hold, xCP (1) becomes both-side superstable.
Moving on to the symmetric xed point x, recall that its local stability
requires that the condition (17) holds. Concerning the inequality on the right
hand side of (17), we denote by pfS that value of S for which the condition
T 0
 
1
2

= 0 is satised. Moreover, S < 
pf
S implies T
0   1
2

< 0. For 0 < en < 1,
pfS corresponds to the positive root of a quadratic equation whose expression
is quite complicated. From simulations we nd that for some meaningful para-
meter combinations, but not for all, 0 < pfS < 1. For en = 1, we are able to
obtain the following, relatively simple, expression:
pfS =
(   )[2(   1)  ]
2(   )(   1) + (3   2 + ) < 1:
(In (27) we give the same condition solved with respect to the parameter ).
One can show that
- if 1 <  < 1+ 2 , it follows that 
pf
S < 0. Therefore this inequality is never
satised;
- if  > 1 + 2 , as S crosses 
pf
S from left to right, the map  undergoes a
pitchfork bifurcation.
A rst interesting result is that, when en = 1, the local stability of the
symmetric xed point does not depend on the trade distance with respect to
the outside region, as measured by the parameter L. This result is a direct
consequence of Proposition 1. The size of local demand (outside demand) inde-
pendent of entrepreneurial migration (i.e. originating from immobile unskilled
workers), instead plays a relevant role, a¤ecting positively pfS :
@pfS
@
=
4(   )(2   1)(   1)
[2(   )(   1) + (3   2 + )]2 > 0:
This implies that increasing the size of local demand vis-à-vis that of outside
demand has a stabilizing e¤ect on the symmetric xed point and tends to favour
dispersion (the opposite holds true by increasing outside demand with respect
to local demand which has a destabilizing e¤ect on x and tends to favour
agglomeration).
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The local stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium and, therefore,
the characteristics of the bifurcation value determine the specic location pat-
tern (see Püger and Südekum [2008]) as trade integration between region 1 and
2 intensies. The typical bifurcation scenario of a standard 2-region FE model
is catastrophic agglomeration, with an immediate jump to a Core-Periphery
equilibrium, corresponding to a subcritical pitchfork bifurcation. However, in
our framework, a smoother agglomeration process can also emerge in correspon-
dence of a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation with the emergence of two (locally)
stable interior asymmetric equilibria.
In order to study in detail the properties of the pitchfork bifurcation, even
though only for the case en = 1, we rst redene our central map to highlight
the control parameter we are interested in, the trade freeness parameter S ,
and we verify how these may change when another crucial parameter, the size
of local demand (at least, that part that it is not a¤ected by entrepreneurial
movements and that originates from immobile unskilledworkers) , varies. The
redened map is:
Z(S ; x) = 

1 + (1  x) T (S ; x)
1 + xT (S ; x)

From the theory of dynamical systems (see e.g., Wiggins [2013]), in corre-
spondence of a pitchfork bifurcation, that is, when S = 
pf
S and x =
1
2 , the
following conditions must hold:
1. @Z@S

pfS ;
1
2

= 0 , @T@S

pfS ;
1
2

= 0;
2. @
2Z
@x2

pfS ;
1
2

= 0 , @2T@x2

pfS ;
1
2

= 0;
3. @
2Z
@x@S

pfS ;
1
2

6= 0 , @2T@x@S

pfS ;
1
2

6= 0;
4. @
3Z
@x3

pfS ;
1
2

6= 0 , @3T@x3

pfS ;
1
2

6= 0:
Moreover, the sign of the following expression can be used to determine on
which side of pfS the asymmetric xed points, at least initially, lie:
5.  
@3Z
@x3
(pfS ;
1
2 )
@2Z
@x@S
(pfS ;
1
2 )
> (<)0,  
@3T
@x3
(pfS ;
1
2 )
@2T
@x@S
(pfS ;
1
2 )
> (<)0:
When this expression is larger (less) than zero, the pitchfork bifurcation is
supercritical (subcritical); for the particular case
@3Z
@x3

pfS ;
1
2

= 0 (21)
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the pitchfork bifurcation is critical7 (for example, in Fig.6 the intersection point
of the pitchfork and fold bifurcation curves  = pf and  = f is a codimention-
2 bifurcation point at which the pitchfork bifurcation is critical: it occurs si-
multaneously with two fold bifurcations). We have that:
- Condition 1 is veried due to the fact that at the symmetric equilibrium
V1 = V2 and @V1@S =
@V2
@S
for any S ;
- Condition 2 is veried due to the symmetric properties of the map Z(x).
Indeed, at the bifurcation point, this condition can be reduced to:
@2V1
@x2   @
2V2
@x2 =
@2

1
P

1

@x2  
@2

2
P

2

@x2 = (1 + )

( @1@x )
2
P+21
1   (
@2
@x )
2
P+22
2

 
2

@1
@x
@P1
@x
P+11
 
@2
@x
@P2
@x
P+12

+

@21
@x2
P1
 
@22
@x2
P2

  

@2P1
@x2
P+11
1  
@2P2
@x2
P+12
2

= 0;
which holds, given that at x = 12 :
1 = 2, P1 = P2, @1@x =  @2@x , @P1@x =  @P2@x , @
21
@x2 =
@22
@x2 and
@2P1
@x2 =
@2P2
@x2 .
Note that both conditions 1 and 2 hold also for the case 0 < en < 1;
- Concerning condition 3 we obtain the following result:
@2T
@x@S

pfS ;
1
2

=
=
2(2   1)[(   1)(   )2 + (+ 3   2)]2
(   )(   1)2(+ 2)[(   1)(   )2 + (   1 + )] > 0
which is always satised;
- Concerning condition 4 we obtain the following result:
@3T
@x3

pfS ;
1
2

=
=
324(2 1)3f12( 1)2( )2+[2(2 3)2+4(3 )( 1)2] ( 1+)[2( 1)+]g
( 1)3(+2)[( 1)( )2+( 1+)]3
According to this expression condition 4 may or may not hold depending on
parameter combinations;
- Finally, considering condition 5, the sign of @
3T
@x3

pfS ;
1
2

coincides with
that of the following expression:
K = 12(   1)2(   )2 + [2(2   3)2+
+4(3  )(   1)2]   (   1 + )[2(   1) + ]: (22)
This allows us to state the following
Proposition 2 Lets assume that  > 1 + . Then there exists a value of the
parameter  =  with 0 <  < 12 such that K < 0 for  < , K > 0 for  > ,
and K = 0 for  = , where K is given in (22).
7 If the condition (21) holds not only for x = 1
2
; but for also in some neighborhood of
x = 1
2
, this means so-called degenerate pitchfork bifurcation (see Sushko and Gardini [2010])
as sketched, for example, in Fig.7, that cannot occur in the considered map.
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Proof. First we consider the following second degree equation based on (22):
a2 + b + c = 0; (23)
where
a = 12(   1)2(   ) > 0;
b = 2(2   3)2 + 4(3  )(   1)2  (<)0;
c =  (   1 + )[2(   1) + ] < 0:
Therefore (23) admits one positive and one negative solution. In order to have
real roots, it must be:
 = b2 4ac = (12 82 3)4+4(102 12+3)( 1)22+42( 1)4 > 0:
 = 0 is a quartic equation that admits four solutions of which only two at
most are real (or none). Dene y = 2. Then we can write:
 = b2 4ac = (12 82 3)y2+4(102 12+3)( 1)2y+42( 1)4 = 0:
(24)
This is now a second degree equation whose solutions, y1 and y2, are real sincee = 144(3   1)(2   1)2(2   1)5 > 0:
Moreover, these solutions are both negative for 1 <  < 3+
p
3
4 and one positive
and one negative for  > 3+
p
3
4 , i.e. y2 < 0 < y1: Therefore, for 1 <  <
3+
p
3
4 ,
 > 0 always; and for  > 3+
p
3
4 ,  > 0 as long as 0 < x < 1 < x1. Therefore
also in this case  > 0 for all relevant values of .8
Therefore, (23) admits two real solutions, one positive and one negative.
Lets call the positive solution , where  =   b 
p

2a . Given that a > 0, we have
K < 0 for 0 <  <  and K > 0 for  > ; and K = 0 when  = , where K is
given in (22).
Finally, notice that the condition  < 12 corresponds to
4( + )(+    1)[   (1 + )] > 0:
That can be further reduced to    (1 + ) > 0.
Q.E.D.
In summary, the size of local (immobile) demand matters with respect to
outside (immobile) demand determining the location pattern at the bifurcation
8Note that x2 > 1 as long as the sum of the coe¢ cients in the equation (24) is positive,
that is,
46   165 + 644   1443 + 1442   60 + 9 > 0
Looking at the solutions of the six degrees equation, none of them is real. It follows that this
inequality is always satised or never satised. It is immediate to check, by substituting any
number for , that the condition holds.
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point, which is catastrophic when the size of local demand is su¢ ciently large
in relative terms and it is smooth when it is the size of outside demand that
becomes su¢ ciently large in relative terms (see Fig.7c and b, where we assume
 = 0:4 and  = 0:32, respectively). We envisage that, by continuity, a similar
result must hold also when we allow for a local manufacturing sector in region
3. Indeed Fig. 4 conrms for the case 0 < en < 1 the possible occurrence of
these bifurcation scenarios.
Finally, concerning the inequality on the left hand side of (17), it holds for
a su¢ ciently small value of  or for a su¢ ciently high value of . When this
condition does not hold, a ip bifurcation scenario emerges, with the possible
occurrence of complex behavior, involving the global properties of dynamics.
We turn now to such type of analysis.
5.3 Numerical results
In this section we study local and global dynamics of the map  in generic case.
Recall that  depends on 7 parameters satisfying the following conditions:
 > 1;  > 0; 0 < ; S ; L; en < 1; 0 <  < 1=2; L  S :
Our main interest is related to the inuence on dynamics of the parameters S ,
L, n and , so, we can x the other parameters as follows:
 = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10; (25)
and investigate bifurcation structure of the remaining parameter space by means
of 1D and 2D bifurcation diagrams. This analysis extends the results of the caseen = 1 to that of en < 1, when the manufacturing sector is also located in the
outside region.
First, in Fig.5 we show a 2D bifurcation diagram in the (S ; )-parameter
plane for L = 0:1 and en = 0:8: Here di¤erent colors are related to di¤erent
attracting cycles, namely, the red region S to the symmetric xed point x;
the pink region AS to coexisting asymmetric xed points xa and x0a; the blue
region CP1 to the Core-Periphery xed points xCP (0) and xCP (1); the blue
region CP2 to the xed points xCP (0) and xCP (1) which are locally repelling
but represent attractors in Milnor sense; the green region to 2-cycles; the other
colors correspond to cycles of periods k  30 and white region is related either
to higher periodicity or to chaotic attractors. Clearly, the upper boundary of the
region S in Fig.5 is related to the ip bifurcation of x; while its lower boundary
is the pitchfork bifurcation curve. In the following subsections we discuss both
scenarios in detail.
Before doing so, let us briey summarize the economic interpretations that
can be drawn from Fig. 5: for high free tradess inside the Union (i.e. for a
high value of S) agglomeration of economic activities in one of the two regions
of the Union is a likely outcome; lowering this parameter leads to an equal
distribution of economic activities (if S enters in the red area S) or to an
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uneven distribution but with manufacturing production in both regions (if S
enters in the pink area AS); these congurations lose stability for further lower
values of internal trade freeness giving rise to cyclical attractors. For very low
values of S agglomeration of the industrial activity of the Union might again
be the long-run outcome. It is interesting to note that the bifurcation lines are
positively sloped, i.e. the bifurcation values for S depend positively upon .
Lower values of  shrink the range for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable
(i.e. the red area S), shifting it to the left ; i.e. reducing trade distance with
a big country (which reduces the share of unskilled workers in the Union and
increases the demand from outside) favours agglomeration processes and Core-
Periphery patterns inside the Union even at lower level of trade integration.
A similar pattern is actually found wrt the external trade freeness L (in
numerical simulations not incuded in the paper).
Figure 5: 2D bifurcation diagram in the (S ; )-parameter plane for L = 0:1;en = 0:8;  = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10: The 1D bifurcation diagrams related to the
straight lines with arrows are shown in Fig.4.
5.3.1 Bifurcation scenario via a pitchfork bifurcation
Let us clarify which kind of pitchfork bifurcation occurs if the (S ; )-parameter
point crosses the lower boundary of the region S: In Fig.4 we present 1D bi-
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furcation diagrams corresponding to cross-section of this boundary for xed 
varying S as indicated by the straight lines with arrows. In particular, in
Fig.4a, where  = 0:05, one can see that for increasing S the xed point x
 un-
dergoes supercritical pitchfork bifurcation (marked by red circle) leading to two
attracting asymmetric xed points, xa and x0a (their basins are separated by the
repelling xed point x), which then merge with the repelling xed points xCP (0)
and xCP (1); respectively, due to the border-transcritical bifurcation (marked by
green circles). In Fig.4b, where  = 0:35; the pitchfork bifurcation is subcrit-
ical leading for decreasing S to two repelling asymmetric xed points xb and
x0b, which soon after merge with x
CP (0) and xCP (1) due to border-transcritical
bifurcation. In the small parameter interval bounded by the values related to
border-transcritical and pitchfork bifurcations, the attracting xed point x co-
exists with the attracting xed points xCP (0) and xCP (1); and their basins are
separated by the repelling xed points xb and x0b:
The question arises about dynamics of the map at the moment when the
pitchfork bifurcation of x and transcritical bifurcation of xCP (0) and xCP (1)
occur simultaneously. As can be seen in Fig.4c where  = 0:18, for decreasing S
at rst two couples of asymmetric xed points are born due to fold bifurcations
(marked by black circles), namely, attracting xed points xa, x0a and repelling
xed points xb, x0b. Then the points xb and x
0
b merge with x
CP (0) and xCP (1);
respectively, due to the border-transcritical bifurcation, while the points xa and
x0a merge with x
 due to supercritical pitchfork bifurcation.
In order to clarify the location of the fold bifurcation curve let us come back
to the case en = 1 (see Commendatore et al. [2012]). As we already mentioned, in
such a case expressions of the bifurcation curves of the xed points x; xCP (0)
and xCP (1) can be obtained analytically. In particular, the ip bifurcation
boundary is dened by the condition (18) which can be written as
 = fl  ((1 + S)  (1  S))
2(   )(1  S)


(   1) +
2(1 + S)
(1  S)

+
S
(   )(1  S)
;
(26)
the pitchfork bifurcation boundary is dened by the condition (19) which can
be written as
 = pf  
2(   )(1  S)

(1 + S)  (1  S)
(   1) + 2S

; (27)
and the border-transcritical bifurcation boundary satises (15) that can be writ-
ten as
 = tr  S((
=(1 )
S   1) + (1  S))
(   )(1  S)2
: (28)
The curves  = pf and  = tr can intersect each other as it occurs, for
example, in the (S ; )-parameter plane for  = 2;  = 0:45;  = 20 (see
Fig.6). Here the region marked as S + CP1 is related to coexisting attracting
symmetric and Core-Periphery xed points, x; xCP (0) and xCP (1); the region
AS corresponds to two asymmetric attracting xed points xa and x0a; and the
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Figure 6: 2D bifurcation diagram in the (S ; )-parameter plane for  = 2;
 = 0:45;  = 20; en = 1. 1D bifurcation diagrams related to the straight lines
with arrows are shown in Fig.7.
gray region bounded by the fold bifurcation curve  = f is related to coexisting
attracting xed points xCP (0); xCP (1) and xa; x0a.
The 1D bifurcation diagrams, related to super- and subcritical pitchfork bi-
furcations of x are shown in Fig.7a and b, respectively. If the (S ; )-parameter
point crosses the bifurcation curves at the intersection point of pf and tr; one
could expect a 1D bifurcation diagram like the one sketched in Fig.7d. How-
ever, such a diagram is impossible because it would mean that a degenerate
pitchfork bifurcation occurs (see Sushko and Gardini [2010]), with (x)  x in
the complete interval [0; 1]. In fact, the true transition is as shown in Fig.7c
where the xed points xa; x0a and xb, x
0
b are born due to the fold bifurcations
(the related curve  = f obtained numerically is indicated in Fig.6). As one
can see, such a transition occurs not only at the intersection point of the curve
pf and tr but also in some its neighborhood. It is clear that the bifurcation
structure similar to the one shown in Fig.6 exists also in case related to Fig.5,
however, this structure is very tight and di¢ cult to be recognized. The e¤ect
of L, the external trade distance, is similar to that of S : increasing trade
inegration with the outside region destabilizes the symmetric xed point and
favours agglomeration in one of the two regions of the Union.
In this subsection we have shown that the symmetric equilibrium may lose
stability via a pitchfork bifurcation. We paid special attention to the various
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Figure 7: 1D bifurcation diagram for  = 2;  = 0:45;  = 20; en = 1 and
 = 0:25; S 2 [0:01; 0:1] in a),  = 0:4; S 2 [0:08; 0:12] in b),  = 0:32;
S 2 [0:13; 0:19] in c). Degenerate pitchfork bifurcation (which cannot occur in
the map ) is shown schematically in d).
bifurcation scenarios that my occur afterwards and distinguished three cases.
The subcritical bifurcation (depicted in Figs 7b and 4b) is in some sense the
standard case in the New Economic Geography: Between the break and sustain
point values for the trade freeness, both the symmetric and the Core periphery
xed points are stable and their basins of attractions are delimited by unsta-
ble asymmetric xed points. Fixed points coexist and the long-run pattern of
regional industry location is highly sensitive to initial conditions and to pa-
rameters. However, we were able to show that also a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation is possible (as depicted in Figs 7a and 4a): Interestingly, in this
case asymmetric stable xed points are born after the bifurcation - the model,
which is entirely based on standard NEG assumptions, is thus able to generate
endogenously interior asymmetric outcomes (in which economic activity is nei-
ther symmetrically distributed between the two regions nor full agglomerated
in one of the regions). This feature greatly improves the applicability of the
models to real world developments (and is seldom found in other standard NEG
models). The limiting case (depicted in Figs 7c and 4c) shows that also for
these asymmetric stable equilibrium coexistence with the Core periphery equi-
libria is possible (and the related basins of attraction are delimited by additional
asymmetric equilibria that are unstable). Also in this case, the longrun regional
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distribution of industrial activity is highly sensitive upon initial conditions and
on parameters.
Note that we discussed these phenomena wrt a change in the interior trade
freeness (between the two regions of our integration area). However, qualita-
tively similar results can be obtain for a variation of the exterior trade freeness
and for the (mobile) share of entrepreneurs and of unqualied workers. Chang-
ing any of these parameters may lead to asymmetric stable equilibria that may
coexist with stable CP equilibria.
5.3.2 Bifurcation scenario related to a ip bifurcation
In this section we discuss the second type of bifurcation that may lead to a
stability loss of the symetric xed point - the ip bifrucation. We show that the
map can have attracting cycles and chaotic attractors, and that coexistence of
attractors may actually involve either cycles or chaotic attractors with complex
basins of attractions.
In order to comment bifurcation scenario which is observed in the map 
if the parameter point crosses the ip bifurcation boundary of the parameter
region S; that is, when the symmetric xed point x undergoes the ip bifur-
cation, we show in Fig.8 the bifurcation structure for xed ; ;  (see (25)) in
the (S ; en)-parameter plane for  = 0:25; L = 0:01 in a), and in the (L; en)-
parameter plane for  = 0:25, S = 0:15 in b). Note from these Figures a similar
e¤ect of varying the internal and external trade freeness as in Figure 5 thus cor-
roborating the conclusions drawn above: For high trade freeness (in particular
inside the Union) agglomeration is the most likely outcome for industrial loca-
tion; reducing trade freeness leads rst to a stable symmetric equilibrium; then
it gives rise to cyclical solutions; and nally to a full agglomeration outcome. It
is interesting to see that the e¤ect of increasing en (i.e. the relative size of the
industrial sector inside the Union) has a non-monotonic e¤ect: starting from a
low (high) value, increasing en shifts the stable range for the symmetric equilib-
rium towards higher (lower) values of trade freeness. For a highly industrialized
Union (en close to 1) the bifurcation curves are negatively sloped, implying that
the bifurcation values for both dimensions of trade freeness (internal and exter-
nal) depend negatively upon its industrial share in the overall economy. Thus,
if there is a shift in the Unions trading partners towards lower industrialized
regions (en getting even closer to 1), a Core-Periphery long-run position becomes
less likely.
Let us consider the 1D bifurcation diagram related to the cross-section indi-
cated in Fig.8 by the straight line with an arrow. It is shown in Fig.9 togheter
with an enlargement.
One can see in Fig.9a that for decreasing S the xed point x
 undergoes
a supercritical ip bifurcation (at the point marked by black circle) leading to
an attracting 2-cycle g2 = fx0; x1g; whose points are symmetric with respect
to x. Then g2 undergoes a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation (at the point
marked by red circle), due to which two new attracting 2-cycles q2 and q02 are
born, points of which are symmetric to each other with respect to x: If we
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Figure 8: 2D bifurcation diagrams in (S ; en)- and (L; en)-parameter plane.for
 = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10;  = 0:25 and L = 0:01 in a), S = 0:15 in b).
continue to decrease S each of the 2-cycles q2 and q
0
2 undergoes a sequence
of bifurcations following well-known logistic bifurcation scenario starting with
a cascade of ip bifurcations up to a homoclinic bifurcation (marked by blue
points) of 2-cycle g2 (see Fig.9b).
Thus, for the parameter interval bounded by the points related to homoclinic
and pitchfork bifurcations the map  has two coexisting attractors (cycles or
cyclic chaotic intervals shown in red and green). As an example, we show in
Fig.10 two coexisting attracting 2-cycles together with their immediate basins
bounded by the points x0 and x1 of the 2-cycle g2; their preimages by the middle
branch of ; denoted x0; m and x1; m and their preimages by the left and right
branches, respectively, denoted x0; ml and x1; mr. All the preimages of the
immediate basins constitute the total basins of attraction of coexisting 2-cycles,
and these preimages for increasing rank are accumulating to the xed points
xCP (0) and xCP (1) as well as to the xed point x and its preimage by the left
and right branches of , denoted x l and x

 r.
In Fig.11 the map  is at the moment of homoclinic bifurcation of g2 (see the
blue point in Fig.9b), at which two 2-cyclic chaotic attractors merge into one 2-
cyclic chaotic attractor. In fact, the boundary of one chaotic attractor is formed
by the rst critical point9 of the map ; denoted c; and its images ci = i(c);
i = 1; 2; 3; while the boundary of the second chaotic attractor is formed by the
second critical point, denoted c0; and its images c0i = 
i(c0): The rst homoclinic
bifurcation of g2 is dened by the condition 2(c) = x0, or 2(c0) = x1; in which
9Recall that for a 1D continuous noninvertible map f : I ! I; I  R; its local extrema are
called critical points (see Mira et al. [1996]).
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Figure 9: In a): 1D bifurcation diagram of the map  for  = 6;  = 0:45;
 = 10;  = 0:25, L = 0:01 and en = 0:8 related to crossection indicated in
Fig.8 by the straight line with an arrow. In b): An enlargement of the window
indicated in a).
case we have c2 = c03 = x0 and c
0
2 = c3 = x1; that is, two attractors merge at
the points of g2: After this bifurcation, if we continue to decrease S ; one can
observe other coexisting attractors (as already mentioned, if an attractor is not
symmetric with respect to x then there exists one more attractor, symmetric
to it). For example, one can see in Fig.9b a periodic window related to 6-cycle
g6 whose points are symmetric with respect to x; and its pitchfork bifurcation
leads to two new symmetric attracting 6-cycles q6 and q06.
Let us comment now a bifurcation marked in Fig.9a by brown circles. It is
a contact bifurcation of a one-piece chaotic attractor, bounded by the critical
points c and c0; with its basin conned by the xed point xCP (0) and xCP (1).
Such a contact occurs if a parameter point crosses the boundary of the region
CP2 (see Fig.8). In Fig.12a the map  is shown at the moment of such a
contact dened by the condition c = 0 or c0 = 1: After this bifurcation the
locally repelling xed points xCP (0) and xCP (1) become attractors in Milnor
sense because almost all the initial points of the interval I = (0; 1) are mapped
into these xed points in nite number of iterations.
Recall that according to the most spread denition, an attractor A of a map
f : I ! I; I  R; is an attracting set with a dense orbit. An attracting set A
is dened as a closed invariant set for which a neighborhood U exists such that
f(U)  U and fn(x) ! A as n ! 1 for any x 2 U . A Milnor attractor is
dened as a closed invariant set A  I such that its stable set (A) (consisting of
all points x 2 (A) for which !-limit set10 is a subset of A) has a strictly positive
10!-limit set !(x) is the set of all accumulation points under forward iterations of the orbit
with initial point x.
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Figure 10: The map  and its two coexisting attracting 2-cycles (red and green
circles) whose immediated basins indicated by dark and light gray, respectively,
are bounded by the repelling 2-cycle g2 = fx0; x1g and its preimages. Here
 = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10;  = 0:25, L = 0:01; en = 0:8; S = 0:22.
Figure 11: The map  at the moment of homoclinic bifurcation of the 2-cycle
g2 = fx0; x1g leading to merging to two 2-cyclic chaotic intervals shown in red
and green. Here  = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10;  = 0:25, L = 0:01; n = 0:8;
S = 0:2127 (the related point is indicated in Fig.9b by blue circle).
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Figure 12: The map  in a) at the moment and in b) after the contact bifurcation
of the chaotic attractor A = [c; c0] with its basin conned by the xed points
xCP (0) and xCP (1): Here  = 6;  = 0:45;  = 10;  = 0:25, L = 0:01; en = 0:8
and S = 0:187626 in a) (the related point is indicated in Fig.9a by brown
circle), S = 0:18 in b).
Figure 13: 2D bifurcation diagram in the (S ; L)-parameter plane for  = 6;
 = 0:45;  = 10;  = 0:25 and en = 0:8:
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measure, and there is no strictly smaller closed subset A0 of A such that (A0)
coincides with (A) up to a set of measure zero (see Milnor [1985]). As we see,
the basic di¤erence of these two denitions of an attractor is related to the fact
that in the rst case any point from a neighborhood of A is attracted to A, while
in case of a Milnor attractor not necessarily all the points from a neighborhood
of A are attracted to it (in fact, the class of Milnor attractors is wider and it
includes the sets which are attractors according to the rst denition).
For example, one can see in Fig.12b that the points of the green intervals
are mapped into xCP (1) and the points of the red intervals are mapped into
xCP (0): In fact, the interval J1 related to the left at branch of  and all its
preimages (a few of which are shown in Fig.12b) constitute the stable set of
the xed point xCP (1). There is a sequence of preimages of J1 accumulating to
xCP (0), and there is also a sequence of preimages of J1 accumulating to xCP (1):
The same can be said about sequences of preimages of J2 related to the second
at branch of . Thus, in any (one-side) neighborhood of xCP (0) or xCP (1) there
is a set of positive measure of points which rst escape from this neighborhood
and then eventually are mapped to xCP (0); as well a symmetric set of positive
measure of points mapped to xCP (1): Clearly, not all the point of I are mapped
to xCP (0) or xCP (1): a chaotic repellor, separating the basins of the CP xed
points, remains in I; which is a Cantor set formed by all the repelling cycles
and their preimages, as well as uncountably many aperiodic orbits.
In Fig.13 we show bifurcation structure of the (S ; L)-parameter plane for
xed ; ;  (see (25)) and  = 0:25; en = 0:8. Recall that the inequality
S  L has to be satised, thus, the region above the straight line S =
L is not valid. As one can see, qualitative structures of all the presented
2D bifurcation diagrams are quite similar, so that we can suggest that the
bifurcation scenario observed crossing the pitchfork bifurcation boundary of
the region S is qualitatively similar to the one shown in Fig.4, while if the ip
bifurcation boundary of the region S is crossed then the scenario is qualitatively
similar to the one illustrated in Fig.9a.
This Figure allows us to comment on the interaction between the two di-
mensions of trade freeness (external and internal): the negative slope of the
bifurcation curves implies that the bifurcation values for S is decreasing in L
and the stable range of the symmetric equilibrium (the area S) shifts to the
left for higher values of L. This gives a clear hint that agglomeration is the
most likely outcome of a symultaneous process of regional integration within
the Union and external trade liberalisation.
6 Conclusions
The EU has experienced a strong trend of deepening internal economic inte-
gration, including trade and factor mobility. At the same time, the ongoing
strategy Global Europe aims at reducing trade barriers with respect to the
rest of the World. Furthermore, deeper EU integration into the world economy
is currently characterised by the increasing importance of trade partners en-
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dowed with relatively lower levels of technology and higher shares of unskilled
workers.
Given these stylised facts, our research question was to analyse the e¤ects
of deeper regional integration and international liberalisation within the same
theoretical framework, especially shedding light on the importance of the en-
dowments of the external trade partners.
To this end, this paper has presented a 3-region FE-NEG model aiming to
study the interaction of commodity trade and factor mobility under the assump-
tion that is in line with stylized facts for EU of mobile entrepreneurs/high
qualied workers and immobile less qualied workers. The model has been set
in discrete time and we studied the dynamic processes involved.
In the model, the world economy includes an economically integrated area
composed of two regions the Union and an outside region. The two regions of
the Union are closely integrated by means of lower mutual trade costs and mobile
entrepreneurs. The outside region is separated from the Union due to high trade
costs and immobile entrepreneurs. We paid particular attention to regional
endowments of entrepreneurs and low qualied workers, considering the outside
region not having a manufacturing sector as limiting case. Despite the analytical
complexity typical for NEG models, we derived some results analytically while,
for other results, we had to use simulations as standard in the NEG literature.
A rst set of results is related to the existence and properties of the multiple
equilibria which are a typical outcome of NEG models:
Most remarkably, our model  although being entirely based on standard
NEG assumption is able to endogenously generate, for signicant parameter
ranges, asymmetric stable equilibria, i.e. long-term positions in which the eco-
nomic activity is still present in both regions of the Union even though it is not
distributed symmetrically. This result is analytically derived for the special case
in which the outside region is a pure rural economy without a manufacturing
sector. Simulations show that it carries over to the general case.
For the standard NEG long-run equilibria, i.e. for the symmetric and the core
periphery equilibria, we take a closer look at the employment structure: We can
show that they respond in a usual Heckscher-Ohlin way to changes in the relative
endowments: increasing the share of the mobile high qualied entrepreneurs or
decreasing the share of low qualied labor favors the employment share of the
manufacturing sector in the resp region. This result holds although the model is
specied in the NEG perspective. Also, it can be shown that trade costs matter 
e.g. a reduction in internal trade costs fosters manufacturing in the two regions
Union (driving the economic activities away from the outside region).
Another set of results pertains to the analysis of the local and global dy-
namics of the specied factor mobility process within the Union.
Surprisingly, we found that the basic bifurcation scenarios are qualitatively
similar in all the parameter planes which we considered. It is initiated by
a pitchfork bifurcation of the symmetric xed point on one side and its ip
bifurcation on the other side. The existence of the constraints in the model give
rise to a particular bifurcation of the CP xed points which we call "border-
transcritical" bifurcation.
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More specic, varying separately the two parameters of trade integration,
internal trade costs / trade freeness or external trade costs / trade freeness
leads to the follwoing bifurcation scenario: For low trade costs, manufacturing
is expected to agglomerate in one region; for intermediate trade cost, a stable
symmetric allocation is the long-run spatial pattern; further increasing the trade
costs leads to cyclical and chaotic attractors which give rise to agglomeration
again for very high trade costs. Given our stylized facts it is interesting to ask
how this pattern changes when the outside region has a lower share of high
qualied entrepreneurs or a higher share of less qualied workers (note that the
latter corresponds also to a higher local demand in the outside region):
We found that the bifurcation values for S (and L) depend positively upon
; a lower value of  shrinks the range of trade costs (trade freness) for which
the symmetric equilibrium is stable and shifts it to higher values of trade costs
(lower values of the trade freeness). In this sense, a higher share of less qualied
workers in the outside region, i.e. a lower value of , favours agglomeration.
In addition, the size of outside demand as measured in  plays also a role in
determining the transition pattern to agglomeration pattern as trade freeness
is increased (we show results for S but the same applies for L): the pitchfork
bifurcation is subcritical for  above a certain threshold  in that we observe
a catastrophic agglomeration pattern; instead, the pitchfork bifurcation is su-
percritical for  below a certain value and we observe a smooth transition to
agglomeration within the Union.
Instead, the e¤ect of increasing the relative size of the industrial sector within
the union has a non-monotonic e¤ect: starting from a low (high) value, the
bifurcation lines are positively (negatively) sloped, implying that the bifurca-
tion values for both dimensions of trade freeness depend positively (negatively)
upon the share of industry within the union; increasing the relative size of
the industrial sector within the union has a destabilizing (stabilizing) e¤ect
on the symmetric allocation, in the sense of shifting the stable range for the
symmetric equilibrium to higher (lower) values of the trade freeness. Thus, a
highly industrialized union experiencing a shift in their trading partners towards
lower industrialized regions will experience a shift of the stability ranges for the
symmetric equilibrium towards lower values of the trade freeness, which makes
agglomeration of economic activities within the Union less likely.
Finally, we comment on the interaction between the two aspects of the trade
freeness: The respective bifurcation lines are negatively sloped implying that
the bifurcation values for S is decreasing in L (and vice versa) and the stable
range of the symmetric equilibrium shifts again to the left for higher values of
L. Simultaneously opening up internally and externally, both contribute to
strengthening the agglomerative forces within the Union.
In addition to the bifurcation scenarios discussed so far, bistability, i.e. co-
existence of attractors, is also a characteristic feature of the model. This goes
well beyond the standard result in NEG models concerning the possible coex-
istence of the symmetric equilibrium and the Core-periphery equilibria; in our
model it applies also to cyclical attractors. In particular, two di¤erent attrac-
tors, namely, two cycles or two cyclic chaotic attractors may coexist, with quite
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complicated structures of the respective basins of attraction. In some cases it is
even impossible to predict to which attractor the system will converge: For low
values of S or L the CP xed points, being locally repelling, attract almost
all the initial points (which is possible due to the at branches of the map).
Moreover, their basins are separated by such a complicated set as a chaotic
repellor. Taking an initial point as close as we wish to one CP point, it cannot
be stated a priori to which of the two CP xed points the system will converge.
History matters and a small perturbation may alter signicantly the long-run
allocation of industrial capital.
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